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Abstract
Spending limits are an important rule in the electoral game. Critics of limits claim
that incumbents write these rules to keep down promising challengers. Their arguments
are seductive but do not stand on a firm empirical base. The data seem quite eager to
support or reject the critics’ view, given the proper massaging. This paper suggests that if
incumbents profit from spending limits, they will take their profit in a way that leaves no
trace in the data. Profit does not come in the form of higher votes for the incumbent, but
as richer government spoils for their close supporters. This explanation goes against the
traditional view of how limits help incumbents. The explanation also helps to explain why
there may never be a winner in the empirical debate on whether incumbents or challengers
profit from limits.
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Introduction
Campaign spending limits are a frustrating topic in the study of elections. Since Palda
(1973) launched the study of the effect that political advertising can have on success at the
polls, researchers have hammered each other with statistics that reject or support the case for
regulating election outlays. Their rivalry is constant because it rests on a simple, unchanging
story. Between elections the incumbent is busy making a name. By the time of the campaign,
money buys the incumbent little recognition. The challenger starts the race unknown and
needs every dollar to win support. In technical terms, the incumbent’s marginal product
of campaign spending is lower than the challenger’s marginal product. This means that a
campaign spending limit will hurt the challenger and help the incumbent. Researchers agree
on the broad lines of the story but differ on whether challengers get the most bang per buck.
Jacobson [1978, 1985, 1990] finds that incumbents get no votes for their money. Green and
Krasno [1988] find that incumbents get almost as many votes from their campaign outlays
as challengers. If Jacobson is right, why do incumbents bother to raise money? If Green
and Krasno are right, why are incumbents the prime movers for a style of campaign finance
reform that could only seem to harm them? The academic rivalry might cool with the answer
to a simple, but neglected question: is money all there is to the election campaign?
In this paper I suggest that the key to the debate on spending limits lies in the platforms
candidates are able to choose. A shift in platforms may hide from researchers the true vote-
getting power of money. An incumbent who is well-funded and expects to win by a wide
margin, may decide to shift his platform. Instead of riding to a strong victory on his campaign
spending, he can choose a platform that favors well-organized special interest groups. These
groups may reward the incumbent with material gifts the majority is not organized enough to
give. By trading votes for favors the incumbent will make it hard for researchers to discover
how productive his campaign spending is. He spends, wins votes, but loses these votes in
return for special interest group favors. To a researcher, the incumbent’s shifting platform
will hide the fact that money, holding all else constant, could win votes for the incumbent.
The problem for researchers is that "all else" is not held constant. As the incumbent spends
more in the foreground, he will be shifting his platform in the background. This effect is
likely to hold only for incumbents. Challengers worry about winning. They have no margin3
of victory to trade against special interest favors. With challengers, researchers can be more
confident about finding the true effect of campaign spending on votes than with incumbents. 1
Recognizing that incumbents may give up popular support for personal riches changes
the way we look at laws that limit campaign spending. If incumbents truly have lower
marginal products of spending than challengers, researchers would predict that a limit that
binds all candidates will lead to incumbents winning by wider margins of victory than they
did before limits. The conjecture of this paper is that spending limits will not show up as a
change in the vote counts of candidates, but rather will help incumbents enrich themselves
at the expense of the majority. Incumbents will give up the lead the limits could give them
by ruling in a way that favors special interests and loses incumbents some of their popular
support.
If incumbents trade popular support for personal riches, then students of elections will
have to look at the data in a new fashion. We may never be able to find out whether
incumbents have lower marginal products than challengers. If we find these lower marginal
products we may be surprised to find that after a limit is imposed, incumbents do not do
any better at the polls than before the limit. They may instead be doing better on the hidden
margin of personal enrichment, a margin beyond our ability to measure.
1. The Traditional Story About Limits
Two common findings are at the heart an academic "folk tale" about spending limits.
Jacobson set the scene in 1978 (and later in his work for the groundbreaking Campaign Finance
Study Group of 1979). His analysis suggested that in 1974 House elections, challengers
gained on average 12.1% of the vote for every $10,000 they spent, where incumbents gained
only 2.8% of the vote for every $10,000 spent. Palda and Palda [1985] added to the
excitement with their finding that in Canadian elections, being a first term incumbent in
1Congleton (1989) has tried to mix campaign spending into a model of candidate platforms, but his approach
takes a different tack from mine. He believes that there is a tradeoff between the vote maximizing platform
the candidate can choose and the contribution maximizing platform. The candidate is in a bind because he
cannot adopt the vote maximizing platform without money to advertise his views. So he must compromise and
deviate from this platform to get the money he needs to win office. Congleton however does not consider the
possibility that candidates trade votes off against personal riches.4
Canadian parliamentary elections was worth an extra 8,1000 (in districts of roughly 50,000
constituents). These two clues are the first step toward understanding who might benefit from
spending limits. Bender [1988], Jacobson [1978], and Lott [1989] reason that incumbents
use franked mailing rights, paid travel, and government office staff to promote themselves
while in office. This assures them a large block of initial voter support but leaves little to
accomplish for incumbent campaign spending. Challenger spending is a threat to incumbents
because challengers have not spent into the range where their money loses its power. A
limit could protect the initial vote advantage of incumbents while saving them the expense
of a pitched battle for election.
"Could" is the operational word in this script. Caution must be exercised before concluding
that limits always hurt challengers. The ability to raise money, and the level of limits, can
change the story. To illustrate, suppose that the incumbent can raise $100,000, and receives
one vote per dollar, all else constant. The challenger can raise $75,000 and receives two
votes per dollar. A $50,000 ceiling is imposed. In this case the ceiling does not affect the
chances of either candidate. The incumbent suffers twice the loss in money raising power but
that money is only half as potent in his hands as in the challenger’s hands. The incumbent
would be glad with the $50,000 ceiling because he could preserve his chances of winning
and avoid the headache of raising $100,000 to the challenger’s $75,000.
Figure 1 gives more detail. The figure should be read from left to right, as we imagine
a limit starting at $100,000 (point A) that sweeps left towards zero. Between $100,000 and
$75,000 (point B) the limit hurts the incumbent. We have to conclude this because before
any limit was imposed the incumbent was able to choose this range, but declined. Between
$75,000 and $50,000 is a gray area. Here the limit has begun to bind the challenger. In this
zone the incumbent’s drop in votes is no worse than in the earlier zone, but his expenses are
smaller. He might be enticed to vote for a spending limit that lessens his chances of winning
provided the savings in money raising toil were large enough. Any limit below $50,000
(point C)dominates all higher limits in the incumbent’s view: his chances of winning are
higher than in the unregulated state, and his expenses are lower. The ideal ceiling would be
one of no campaign spending (point D), such as seem to exist in Japan, and such as come
close to existing in Great Britain at the constituency level. Note that even without limits
the incumbent might expect to win. But the limit can make the win more certain and less5
painful than it would be in a free contest of cash.
Another way to show the gain incumbents may get from lowering the limit comes from
considering the function that could determine a candidate’s probability of winning:
PI(SI,S C)=
SI + SI
SI + SI + SC
(1)
The incumbent’s probability of winning is PI. It rises as incumbent spending SI rises and
falls as challenger spending SC rises. The main thing to notice about this equation is the term
SI which stands for the incumbent’s initial advantage. This term is the campaign dollar value
of franked mailing, government-paid research staff, and of other advantages that come with
elected office. It is fixed for the length of the race. What benefit does the incumbent get from
lowering the spending ceiling? This depends on his or her objective. The candidate may
wish to gain office to control a government jackpot of resources worth J dollars. The cost
of campaigning may be some function of how much money the candidate raises. As Hubert
Humphrey put it, money raising is a "dirty, disgusting, demeaning business." Candidates of
Humphrey’s mind might wish to raise a little less money than they can, even this means
accepting a lower chance of winning the jackpot. As Baron [1989], Palda [1989, 1992],
and Morton and Cameron 1992, have suggested, the incumbent may accomplish this by
maximizing a function of the following sort:
U = PI(SI,S C)J − SI (2)
Where PJ is the jackpot the candidate expects, and SI is both the contribution he accepts
and the value of favors he must pay back to his contributors. Under a ceiling S that binds
both candidates, the incumbent’s objective would be to vary the ceiling to maximize:
U =
 S + SI
2S + SI

× J − S (3)
The derivative of this function with respect to the binding ceiling S is negative for all values
of S. Lowering the ceiling increases the incumbent’s expected jackpot, and lowers his or her
costs of campaigning. The optimum is a corner solution with a ceiling of zero. It can also
be shown that the larger the incumbent’s initial advantage S the more he benefits from any6
lowering of the ceiling. 2 These results hold whether incumbents maximize some sophisticated
objective such as expected surplus or whether they just care about winning (maximizing P).
Sensitive students of the theory of campaign contributions might quail at such an excercise.
The probability function only shows the increasing benefits of lowering the limit once a
limit that binds both candidates is reached. This chain of reasoning cannot say anything
about whether incumbents want a limit in the first place because the reasoning only considers
incumbent welfare after a ceiling has been set on spending. What is missing is a complete
model of the demand for and supply of campaign contributions---the Holy Grail in the
theoretical study of campaign finance. The lack of such a model shows up more clearly
in Figure 1. What is to say that the lines should be drawn straight? As a limit grips the
incumbent at the $100,000 level (point A) the challenger’s ability to raise money will grow
and the incumbent’s ability will recede, making a muddle of the linear progress of our story
from point A to point D. And what is to say that the marginal products of both candidates
are constant?
These are good critiques. But they do not make nonsense of the limits story. Even though
Figure 1 and the probability function demonstration gallop blindly past profound questions
of political equilibrium, they carry us in the right direction: incumbents may want a limit if
they are not too far ahead of challengers in their ability to raise money. Once they decide
they want a limit, they will want to push it to the lowest possible level.
If incumbents are supposed to be so keen on limits, why do we seldom see all incumbents
agreeing to curb campaign spending? Why are spending ceilings seldom set to zero? More
precisely:
1. Why should a minority party favor a limit? If limits preserve individual seats they will
also preserve majorities of seats. Minority parties who favor limits will freeze themselves
out of power. A possible answer is that limits may protect incumbents of all parties
from the dark horse challenger. This challenger will appear at random and strike fear
into the hearts of minority and majority party incumbents with equal frequency. A limit
may protect all incumbents from this threat, but have no effect on the types of national
2When S is large, the incumbent’s marginal product is small. He gets a small bang per campaign buck.
This makes a ceiling interesting for him.7
shifts in opinion that touch every district and unseat a ruling party. This means that
limits would not freeze minority parties out of power, they would only freeze one-off
talented candidates out of their chance at office. To resort to jargon, limits are insurance
against the idiosyncratic risk posed by the threat of abnormally potent challengers. If
this threat is independently distributed across districts, removing the threat to particular
incumbents will have little effect on the final seat counts of their parties. This argument
can be made more precise with the help of the probability function discussed earlier.
Suppose that an incumbent’s chance of winning is as follows:
PI(SI,S C)=
SI + SI
SI + SI +  SC
+ γIREP + δIDEM (4)
Here   is a random variable. A high value of   is bad luck for the incumbent. Fate has
dealt him or her a challenger of high quality. Idiosyncratic risk has put the incumbent
in a pickle. The random terms γ and δ are party risk and IREP,I DEM are indicator
functions taking on the value of 1 if the candidate in question belongs to the party
(Republican or Democrat) indexed by the function, and zero otherwise. These party risk
random terms represent a national mood swing that hits all candidates in a particular
party, challengers and incumbents alike. The way the equation is set up money can do
nothing directly to stop this effect.
How do limits change the balance of power in the legislature? An answer that is both
right and wrong, is that limits have no effect on the balance of power . Table 1 helps
to make this point: In this Table, Republicans control the legislature with 20 seats.
Democrats have 10 seats. Each incumbent of both parties has a 70% chance of winning.
Table 1 suggests that over time the parties will converge to an equal number of seats.
A limit that raised the probability of incumbent victory to 90% would not change the
situation. The Republican party would still lose seats. After the 1994 election it would
have 19 seats to the Democrats’ 11. The difference between this and the unregulated
case is that the Republican’s slide to equality with the Democrats is slower under a limit.
Figure 2 shows the rate of decay of a party’s seats with and without limits. This Figure
also shows what happens when the electorate feels a shock of delight at the thought
of voting Republican (a high value of γ). Incumbent Republicans gain seats, but their
gain does not last forever. In the end limits do not change the fact that a dominant8
party will lose power. Limits put the loss of power off to the future. They "dampen"
the effects of country-wide shifts in opinion on the change in a party’s number of seats.
This dampening is what some call electoral inertia.
Incumbents from the challenging party might not mind a system of limits that builds
inertia into electoral majorities and minorities, provided the inertia is not too large.
These incumbents will weigh the value of being safe in their seats against the frustration
of being in a minority party. This explains why incumbents from all parties may be in
favor of a limit. They may not all agree on the proper height a spending ceiling should
take, but the principle of a ceiling will not offend them.
Incumbents from the challenging party need not be too frustrated about a limit’s effects
on their party’s inertia when random shocks are idiosyncratic. It is in the nature of dark
horse candidates to strike incumbents from both parties with equal frequency. Even
before limits, dark horses do not have much effect on the balance of power. Leaders
of the challenging party are less keen about limits when random shocks strike a party.
In deciding whether to support the ruling party’s proposals for limits, leaders of the
challenging party must weigh the undesirable consequences of inertia against the joys
of personal political security.
There is anecdotal evidence that incumbents of major parties close ranks in the face of
idiosyncratic risk, and that ending this risk may be worth building inertia in elections.
In the last ten years, this risk has worn the face of the public interest group ("P.I.G.s" as
Murray Weidenbaum has described them). In the US these groups worry the two major
parties because they are unpredictable. Independent groups even distress candidates
on whose behalf they advertise. As a former Congressional campaign manager said
"Independent expenditure scares the daylights out of me. A third party comes in
that doesn’t know my strategy or my budget and interjects itself. This could terribly
jeopardize a campaign" (Sabato 1985, pp. 102-3). A congressional aid referred to
independent campaigns as "loose cannons on deck." To tie down these loose cannons,
Congress has tried since 1974 to pass laws that limit how much private citizens or
groups can spend on election advertising. Canadian Members of Parliament have shown
the same need to filter out random dangers to their tenure. In 1993, Canada’s three9
major parties took less than an hour to unanimously pass a law limiting private groups
to $1000 of campaign advertising. As Paltiel showed in a series of studies [1979, 1980,
1981, 1988] Canadian and American incumbents are following in a European tradition
of keeping outsiders on the outside.
2. Why, if limits are so good for incumbents do we not see limits of zero set in all countries
with free elections? The answer hinges again on the balance incumbents must strike
between individual interest and party interest. We can see this by continuing with the
example of the Republican party that holds 20 seats in the legislature to the challenging
party’s 10 seats. If Republican incumbents are all alike, and Republican challengers are





















This expression is unpleasant to look at, but is really saying something simple. It says
that the seats the Republican party can expect to win is the sum of the probabilities
(P REP
I,i ) of each one of its incumbents i winning and the sum of the probabilities of
each one of its challengers I winning (P REP
C,i ). The change in the number of expected

















The first expression says that lowering a ceiling will help individual Republican incum-
bents and tend to increase the number of Republican seats. The second expression says
that a low ceiling will hurt Republican challengers and tend to reduce Republican seats.
If challengers of all parties are identical and incumbents of all parties are identical,
then the incumbent party can only gain seats by raising the limit. 3 Only if Republican
challengers face Democratic incumbents who on average have a larger initial advantage
S than Republican incumbents, will the Republican party have an incentive to hold
3"Identical" here means that all incumbents share the same function that guides their probability of winning
P and have the same campaign spending. Identical challengers resemble themselves in the same fashion. If
all challengers are alike in this sense, and all incumbents are alike then the expected change in the Republican10
back from setting zero limits. In such a case the Republican party might lose seats
from imposing a zero limit. The limit could help Democratic incumbents more than
it helps Republican incumbents because democrats have spent further into the zone of
diminishing returns (this proposition is straightforward to prove).
These two points show that there is tension between the individual incumbent’s interests
and those of his or her party. This tension divides incumbents when it comes to voting for a
limit, and holds back enthusiastic incumbents from voting for a complete ban on campaign
spending.
2. Platforms and Money: A Model
The story I have just told about why incumbents may want to impose spending limits is
easy to understand and seems to fit some important facts about money in elections. The story
is also incomplete. Empirical studies have not settled the question of whether incumbents
have a lower marginal product of spending than challengers. The lower incumbent marginal
product is a pillar of the traditional story. If one day the data speak with a single voice that
declares the marginal products of all candidates equal, does this mean that incumbents have
been wronged by their academic critics? Does this mean that instead of looking for some
sinister motive behind spending ceilings, we should instead acknowledge that legislatures
write such laws in a spirit of public service?
In this section I suggest that the traditional story is headed in the right direction. The
problem though, is that the traditional data may never be able to confirm this point. Incumbents
































This term will always increase as S decreases, meaning that the Republican party will always gain seats from
a falling ceiling, if my rigid assumptions about the similarity of incumbents and the similarity of challengers,
holds.11
may vary their platforms to gain or lose general voter support. Pushed to its extreme, this
thought can lead to the conclusion that campaign money will have no visible effect on votes
at the margin, for either challenger or incumbent. Candidates may instead wish to translate
the support they can win by spending money into policies that lose them votes but favor
special interest group supporters.
The candidate who tries to be loved by many people is not a happy candidate. He has
little room to indulge in policies that suit his fancy. He cannot satisfy friendly special
interests at the expense of the majority. Handing out special favors would lose him the love
of the masses. What if suddenly he were given some special advantage over his opponent
that gave him a lead in the polls (such as government paid mailings during the years between
elections)? Would he ride to victory on this head-start? He might. Or he might decide to
push his luck. He could favor his hangers-on with special favors. By skewing his platform to
favor special interests he would lose some of the lead that came with his special advantage.
What would he do with an unexpected campaign contribution? He would spend it to raise
his votes, build support, and then he would choose a policy that favors his faction and loses
him nearly all the support the campaign contribution won him.
To a researcher it would appear as if campaign spending had no effect at the margin.
The apparent impotence of money would hide that the money has allowed the candidate to
promise special favors to his followers. If such hidden forces are at play, campaign spending
limits will also work in hidden fashions. If spending limits allow incumbents to protect their
lead, they may wish to lose this lead in order to favor their friends. The limit will not change
the final tally of votes between challenger and incumbent. Instead, the limit will change the
final distribution of government favors across the electorate.
To get to these conclusions it helps to have an idea of how money works on the minds
of voters. Two effects should be at work: how effectively money reaches the voter, and
the message that money delivers. It is usually the first effect that researchers have in mind
when they set out to measure the effect of money on votes. But the second effect---the
platform---may be just as important a determinant of the productivity of campaign spending.
This means that the way voters filter information and the information candidates choose to
send out are at the heart of the votes production function. To understand this production
function we must look in detail at how voters make up their minds and how candidates set12
their platforms.
Voters
Let us start by looking at voters, since they are the basis for candidate actions. The first
thing a voter asks himself or herself is, "From which candidate can I expect the greatest
satisfaction?" Satisfaction can mean many things but to keep the story simple it helps to
speak of a single index that feeds satisfaction. How much more income a voter has under
one candidate is a possible choice for such an index. The reader who finds this too simplistic
a view will, on reading further, learn that my choice of an index is incidental to the picture
of the voter I am building up.
The incumbent may promise a particular citizen the following change in income: YI. The
citizen will believe this promise and not believe it at the same time. As Wittman [1989]
argues, on average candidates tell the truth. Political competition weeds out persistent liars,
or candidates who cannot deliver on their promises. The problem from the voter’s point of
view is that hidden forces beyond the candidate’s control will drive a wedge between what
is promised and what is delivered. The economy may dip in the years during which the
incumbent had promised more government spending. This dip ties the incumbent’s hands and
does not allow him to deliver entirely on his promises. Other hidden forces, described in the
economics literature as "principal-agent" problems, make it impossible for voters to monitor
their leaders as they would wish. Sometimes voters will be blessed with unexpectedly good
agents. At other times the agents will be unexpectedly bad. This means the income after the
election that the voter realizes under the incumbent, Y realized
I will look something like this:
Y
realized
I = YI +  I (9)
Here  I stands for the hidden forces the voter must guess at if he wants to form some
impression of the range, or "distribution" of possible realized incomes Y realized
I (Bernhardt
and Ingberman [1985] had a functional form like this in mind in their general treatment of
races between incumbents and challengers).
The voter’s problem is that he or she can never tell precisely what part of realized income
is thanks to the incumbent, and what part is the work of chance. At least in a competitive
system the voter can expect that on average his guesses will be right. No one will be able to13
trick him time after time. Put differently, the voter’s expectations (denoted by the operator




And   is the same for all voters. It is normally distributed with mean zero and standard
deviation σI . This is a formal way of saying that the candidate tells the truth on average
and that the voter is aware of the candidate’s honesty. This reflects the fact that the political
market is competitive. Persistent liars are recognized and weeded out.
A voter will vote for the incumbent if his expected utility, E[u], under the incumbent is
greater than that under the challenger. In other words if
￿I,C = E[u(Y
realized
I )] − E[u(Y
realized
I )] > 0 (11)
Once again, the assumption is not innocent. It says that a voter will choose the candidate
who is best for him even if that voter does not believe his ballot can make a difference
(be instrumental) to the election outcome. Readers who believe that voters participate in
elections for instrumental reasons will wonder where I have hidden the term which shows
the probability that the voter in question will cast the decisive vote. Others who follow
Coleman’s (1990) notion that people vote to obey societal norms will be less bothered by
the omission of such a term. I have not included it because I believe it is not central to the
analysis, and because debate on this topic is far from reaching a consensus. Chamberlain and
Rothschild (1981) believe the probability of being decisive to be very small for communities
of more than a thousand people. Ledyard (1984), who takes a game-theoretic approach to
participation, believes it can be large even in large communities.14
Expanding both expected utilities in a second-order Taylor series gives: 4






  (YI) − σ
2
Cu
  (YC)] (14)
Let us try to understand this expression by joining a voter during the middle of an election
campaign and asking him a few questions. Suppose this voter tells you that he wants to vote
for the incumbent even though he thinks his income would be higher under the challenger.
At first this voter appears irrational. If he had a grasp of technical jargon he could reverse
our impression. He would explain that he has unbiased expectations ( E[Y (realized)I]=YI),
and believes that on average his income would be higher under the challenger, so that
u(YI) − u(YC) < 0 . The problem is that he believes the challenger could either be a
great success in office or a great disaster. That is, σC is very ‘‘large’’. 5 Later in the
campaign, after seeing some advertisements by the challenger our voter changes his mind.
The advertisements simply confirm his expectation that u(YI) <U(YC) and in the appropriate
jargon, he explains that campaign advertisements have reduced the variance of perceived
future challenger performance to the point where his ￿ I,C has become negative. Once the
voter’s ￿I,C has flipped from positive to negative, he has crossed what has come in the
literature to be called a Downsian threshold, and decides to vote for the challenger. 6
In this model then, campaign spending reduces the variance of a candidate’s perceived
4This expression comes from recognizing that the second- order Taylor-series expansion of expected utility
from, say, incumbent victory, is:
E[u(Y realized
I )] = E[u(YI)+ u (YI)+
1
2





Iu  (YI) (13)
The normally distributed error means that we can ignore third-order and higher-order terms of the Taylor
expansion. The normal distribution has no moments beyond the second moment.
5This statement can be made more precise. If the voter favors the incumbent even though u(YI) <u (YC)
then it must be that the second expression in the ￿ I,C equation is positive enough to outweigh this difference.
Note that σ2
Iu  (YI) < 0 and −σ2
Cu  (YC) > 0. And because of diminishing marginal utility, u  (YI) >u   (YC).
This means that σ2
C must be so large that when multiplied by its relatively smaller second-derivative of utility,
its negative effect still outweighs all other positive effects.
6Noll [1993] has recently presented an excellent formal model of this threshold that is more general, but less
operational than the one I present here.15
performance. Advertising may reduce variance by forcing the candidate to commit to a
well-defined platform. This would give him less principal-agent slack to exploit.
By advertising, a candidate might change not only his variance, but that of his rival:
σI = σI(SI,S C) (15)
σC = σC(SC,S I) (16)
where (SI,S C) are campaign spending by incumbent and challenger. Now we can see how
campaign spending will work to change a voter’s mind. The effect of increased challenger











  (YC) (17)
The above equation suggests that there are several ways in which a candidate can increase
his popularity with voters. He can reduce uncertainty about himself or he can try to increase
uncertainty about his rival. Holding platforms constant, a candidate can always benefit from
clarifying his platform, even if that platform is disliked by a majority of voters. 7 He can also
always benefit from sowing uncertainty about his rival, even if his rival has an unpopular
platform.
I want to caution that this is by no means the only way of modeling the effect of spending
on the voter’s knowledge. It is possible that voters also are uncertain of their estimate of
candidate variances ( σI,σ C). Spending may clarify what this variance is and reveal that it
was larger than the voter thought. If this sort of effect was at work, campaign spending
would tend to reduce voter support for the candidate. The particular "information structure"
I have chosen can be disputed on these grounds. The skeptical reader however is encouraged
to substitute his own information structure. He will discover that it has little bearing on the
point I am trying to make in this paper.
The above equation is the basis for understanding a candidate’s marginal product of
campaign spending (the Appendix goes into more detail). The equation shows how close a
7For example, if the candidate is an incumbent and most voters perceive u(YI) as being less than u(YC),
the incumbent can still gain votes by reducing the variance of his position. He may be so good at reducing
variance even people who do not like him---in the sense that u(YI) <u (YC)---vote for him.16
particular voter is to the threshold of changing his mind about a candidate. When a candidate
spends money he will lead some voters over this threshold. How many he leads for each
dollar he spends is his marginal product of campaign spending on votes. A candidate who is
not known might be able to lower this variance quite significantly with a few advertisements
that spell out some basic facts" "Am I am man or a woman? What is my ethnic background?
What experience can I bring to the job?" Candidates who are well know may have a hard
time bringing this variance down.
The incumbent who has already used the resources of government to promote himself and
reduce uncertainty about his platform may find that the effect of further campaign spending
on his variance is small. This does not necessarily mean the marginal product of his spending
on votes is small. Where he sets his platform will affect how many people are poised to cross
the threshold of decision and come over to the incumbent. In other words, the statistical
distribution of voter’s thresholds will have a bearing on the incumbent’s marginal product.
This distribution will be determined in part by variations in the parameters of voter utility
functions, but also by variations in the income changes that the incumbent promises.
This is the crucial point to understand about marginal products. They are not a mechanical
relation between inputs of money and outputs of votes, but a fluid quantity that incumbents
and challengers can influence by their political policies. In this light the traditional story
about how spending limits help in incumbents needs to be revised. To see how this revision
must go, we need to consider the behavior of candidates more closely.
Candidates
Now that we have a sense of the mechanics of platforms and votes, we can ask what
platform a candidate will choose. The platform he chooses depends on his goals. Does he
want a large majority of votes, or is he looking for something else? "Something else" might
be special interest favors that the candidate "buys" by announcing a platform that does not
raise him to the heights of popularity. What are the mechanics of such a tradeoff and who
is best suited to playing this sort of game?
The game in question is one of taking money from some groups in society and enriching
others. This is in large part what candidate platforms do. The state provides public17
goods, but there is remarkable agreement between the parties on the need for these goods.
Disagreements between parties generally center on policies that help some groups at the
expense of others. Most economic regulation serves to protect industries. Seventy percent
of government spending is on transfer payments. It is this sort of divisive activity I am
thinking of when I speak about candidates setting their platforms.
The analysis developed so far suggests that incumbents have a magic source of money
that makes them less abrasive redistributors of public funds than challengers appear to be.
This is because the incumbent can promise a "certainty equivalent" level of income to all
voters that is above the certainty equivalent that the challenger can promise. This certainty
equivalent level of income is implicit in the function that determines how much expected
utility a particular voter expects from the incumbent (I have avoided indexing this function
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The certainty level of income a candidate can offer any voter depends on two quantities:
the size of the government jackpot, and the variance of the candidate’s perceived platform.
The jackpot should be the same for incumbents and challengers. Once in power it does
not matter who you were before coming into power. On this score, the level of certainty
equivalent income that challengers and incumbents can distribute is the same. When it comes
to certainty equivalent income generated by low variances of perceived platforms, incumbents
have an advantage. The above equation says that the amount of certainty equivalent income
a candidate can offer increases as the perceived variance of his platform decreases. The
thought can be restated as, the certainty equivalent income a candidate can offer is the real
income at his disposal from the government jackpot, less a risk premium R that adjusts for
the variance of his perceived platform. For incumbent and challenger and a particular voter
this can be written as:
Y
certainty
I = YI − RI (20)
Y
certainty
C = YC − RC (21)18
The incumbent advantage lies in that RI <R C. The incumbent enjoys a degree of "tolerance"
with voters. This tolerance is the difference between risk premiums: Tolerance = RC −RI.
Tolerance is like a public good. As Shakespeare might have put it "The quality of Tolerance
is not strained." No one is excluded from its benefit and there is no rivalry in voters’ enjoyment
of it. As the word indicates, Tolerance means that the incumbent has some room to offend
voters without losing their support. The challenger has negative tolerance and has no room
to offend.
How will an incumbent use his Tolerance? This depends on his strategy. I suggest that
incumbents may trade off their tolerance for support from special interest groups. Anything
that helps increase tolerance, such as an increase in campaign funds, could increase the
incumbent’s votes. Instead of allowing himself to come to power on a large majority, he may
choose to dissipate his added Tolerance. He will dissipate Tolerance by favoring special
interests at the expense of the majority.
I base these thoughts in part on Abramovitz’s (1991) study of Congressional elections.
He found that "The more often an incumbent voted with the opposing party on the floor, the
greater his margin of victory became...a representative who voted with the opposing party
100% of the time would have added almost 10 percentage points to his margin over the
challenger as compared with the margin he would have received if he had voted strictly
along party lines." In other words, by always trying to please the majority, incumbents can
win votes.
Why would the incumbent want to favor a minority and how would the process enrich
the incumbent? Here we enter a speculative zone of political research. It is reasonable to
assume that incumbents want material and psychological benefits in return for pleasing their
supporters. But this assumption is vacuous unless we have a sense of how important material
benefits are to incumbents. Do they really try to convert the power of their station into
personal wealth? Views on this question are mixed because evidence is scare. The guise in
which wealth comes to the incumbent is hard to spot. Incumbents who do favors for some
groups of interests will later be hired by those groups. Or the incumbent’s children will be
hired. The variety seems endless. Compensation for official favors does not fit into one
mold.
To squeeze as much out of his office as he can, the incumbent may wish to grant favors19
to special interest groups. He may wish to concentrate his favors because small, highly
organized groups are better able to return the favor than large, unorganized groups. The
molasses growers of the US get to sell their sugar in the US at twice the world price.
Politicians protect these growers because the growers are better organized and informed than
the millions of Americans who are forced to pay a cartelized price for their sweets. If
politicians ended sugar protection they might lose more material payback from the molasses
lobby. The loss of this material support may outweigh the value of the votes that politicians
gained from a public that is please with low sugar prices.
If we accept that incumbents have a tendency to transfer resources away from the majority
to the minority, then these incumbents will exploit their tolerance. What is the formula
by which incumbents convert Tolerance into riches for their clique? This is an important
question. If it is hard for the incumbent to convert Tolerance to riches, he will try to
maximize votes, and not worry about finessing his platform for some hidden material gains.
In such a case we would expect to observe that incumbents have lower marginal products
than challengers for all the reasons laid out in the traditional story I told in Section 2
of this essay. If the incumbent is able to convert Tolerance to material riches, the story
can take endless twists. The exploitation of tolerance will depend on how challengers and
incumbents time the announcement of their platforms. If the challenger announces first, the
incumbent with a positive tolerance can dominate any challenger strategy, simply because he
has more resources to redistribute. By taking the same position as the challenger on how he
will redistribute material resources, the incumbent can win, because in addition to material
resources he offers everyone a greater sense of security that he can deliver on his promises.
In other words, he has more "shadow income" to redistribute. If the challenger’s strategy
is to concentrate resources into a few hands the incumbent can offer the same package
and maximize his material takings without even depleting his tolerance. If the challenger’s
strategy is not to redistribute resources from one group to another, the incumbent can still
win by redistributing money to a select few. But the incumbent’s margin of victory will be
small because he has exhausted his tolerance. In this last case, campaign spending will not
seem to help the incumbent much. He will use money to increase his tolerance. Then he
will dissipate this tolerance by favoring special interest groups, who then pay the incumbent
off. Money in this setting does not get votes: it gets money.20
I do not believe that candidates behave entirely like this. Winning with big margins is
comforting for most candidates. But maximizing votes is note the sole purpose of running
for office. Dictators trade off popular support against personal riches, as several authors
have argued [Usher and Engineer 1987, Palda 1993]. Why not candidates in democratic
elections? Democracy puts a limit to the forms this tradeoff can take. But if these limits are
weak, candidates will have room to trade votes for riches. The better they are able to make
this tradeoff, the less effect will marginal increases in campaign spending appear to have on
electoral outcomes.
3. Why Techniques of Measurement May Have to Change
If the story I have told of how candidates change platforms holds, then the way researchers
tease results out of the data will have to change. For the last twenty years the following
equation has held the profession’s attention:
VOTES I = a0 + a1SI + a2SC + a3DEMOGRAPHICS + ··· (22)
The votes of the incumbent VOTES I are a function of his spending and challenger spending,
plus district demographics such as average age and education of citizens. This equation needs
a new variable: the candidate’s platform. Proxies for such a variable are available in the
ratings that liberal and conservative groups give to each candidate for Congress in the US.
Another possible proxy is a candidate’s willingness to cross the floor on House or Senate
votes. This might be a better index of how eager he is to please the masses. If he does
not cross often, he may be trying to exploit his Tolerance. To date Abramovitz is the only
researcher I am aware of who has used such a proxy as a controlling variable in a regression
measuring the effect of campaign spending on votes. He does not however seem to have been
aware of the significance of his calculation. His results indicate that challenger campaign
spending is more effective at winning votes than incumbent spending. More sophisticated
efforts at measuring platform might include changes in taxes and government spending.
Whether future results show that challengers get more bang per buck than incumbents, the
theory cannot say. The theory is only there to tell us what is missing.
4. Policy Towards Incumbents21
It would not surprise me if one day researchers get past these data problems and find
that incumbents have the same marginal product of campaign spending (holding platforms
constant) as challengers. They may even have higher marginal products. Incumbents hold
office because they have political talent. This talent may compensate for the fact that
incumbents drive down their marginal products by spending heavily between campaigns.
Would this mean that campaign spending limits hurt incumbents? Reformers take this as the
crucial question in campaign finance legislation. This is also the theme of the present paper:
a limit helps the incumbent with a small marginal product because it allows him to convert
more votes into personal riches. If limits harm incumbents, this must mean that they are
good for the general public.
Caution is needed before jumping to such conclusions. If incumbents are proved to have
the same marginal products of campaign spending as challengers, or even larger marginal
products, a limit may lessen the incumbent’s chances of winning. There seems to be nothing
in such a situation to appeal to incumbents. Except that, incumbents may benefit from the
limit because of the security it buys them. The incumbent may be willing to accept a lower
chance of winning in return for the security that a spending limit will protect him from a
powerful dark horse challenger. Risk averse incumbents may behave in the same fashion
risk averse investors behave. They will accept a lower margin of victory in return for a more
secure margin of victory.
Even if incumbents get no benefit of any sort from limits, there is a final question the
researcher must consider before concluding that limits are a good thing. How does the
welfare of voters change when candidates are less able to communicate with them? The
Appendix suggests it does not matter whether the challenger or the incumbent has a bigger
marginal product of campaign spending. Voters lose information with a limit. The loss
reduces the benefit they expect from the outcome of an election.
To see what it means to lose utility from having less information I have derived the
utility gain in dollars to the voter when the incumbent spends an extra dollar on his or her
campaign. In the Appendix I show that this dollar value of utility is proportional to






The first term γ is a coefficient of relative risk aversion. Its sign is negative. The second22
term PI is the probability the incumbent will win. The last term shows how incumbent
spending will lower the variance of his or her perceived platform. Its sign is negative. The
expression can be read this way: when an incumbent spends money he reduces the variance
of his perceived platform. This has a positive expected dollar value of utility for voters.
Ex ante their utility is higher because the incumbent’s platform has not changed but the
uncertainty surrounding that platform has fallen. This value is magnified if the incumbent’s
chances of winning are large (voters do not care much about reduced variance of platform if
the candidate had no chance of getting into power). This effect is further magnified by the
number of voters who hear the incumbent’s message, and their degree of risk aversion. Risk
averse voters will value information that reduces their uncertainty about candidate platforms.
A similar relation holds for the challenger.
A limit reduces the expected utility of voters no matter what the relative sizes of incumbent
and challenger marginal products. Suppose that incumbents get more bang per buck than




∂SI, the influence of incumbent spending on the variance of his perceived
platform, is larger for the incumbent than for the challenger. A ceiling will reduce the
incumbent’s chance of winning PI and the effect will be magnified by the fact that people
weigh heavily the variance of his platform. So on this score voter utility falls. But voters
must also consider what is happening to challengers. The challenger’s PC rises by exactly as
much as PI fell. On this score voter expected utility rises. This effect though is not enough
to outweigh what happened to the incumbent, because for the challenger the marginal effect
of money on reducing variance
∂σ2
C
∂SC is smaller than the similar term for the incumbent. Put
simply, a limit reduces the incumbent’s chance of winning and this chance of winning is
highly prized by voters because they have confidence in the incumbent’s ability to carry out
his campaign promises. The same story holds if challengers got more bang per buck from
their spending. A spending limit reduces expected voter welfare no matter which candidate
is more powerful. Only if candidates are evenly matched will a limit have no effect on voter
welfare.
It is important to recognize the shortcomings of this analysis. Ex ante measures of utility
are not very satisfying for understanding the benefits voters get from election races. All
we are measuring is the benefit of reducing voter anxiety before an election outcome. If23
elections are mostly about zero-sum redistributions of money, the final outcome will be a
wash. What the winners gain will be balanced by what the losers have taken away from them.
The importance of campaign spending for voter welfare cannot be understood by looking
at an isolated increase or decrease in candidate outlays. The real importance of campaign
spending for voter welfare depends on the setting in which campaign money is spent. In
a competitive setting al aBecker (1958) where politicians are free to contest each others’
arguments, spending will weed out candidates who lie or bungle. Campaign spending laws
are part of the background in which candidates of quality evolve. Eventually these candidates
may overrun others who impose needless deadweight costs on their people. If spending limits
prevent this evolution, they will make voters unhappy. Formal support for such a conjecture
is, however, a long way off. Such support awaits the arrival of indices that can measure the
quality of a candidate, indices that measure the competitiveness of a political system, and
techniques to relate these two indices and show that competitive electoral systems gives us
quality candidates. 8
Conclusion
The goal of this paper has been to show that there are problems with the way researchers
think about the productivity of campaign spending. These problems distort the way we think
about campaign spending limits.
A candidate may appear to get no votes for the money he spends. Researchers will find
this result if at the same time as spending money, the candidate is shifting his platform.
This may explain why empirical researchers have generally found that the marginal product
of incumbent campaign spending is smaller than that of challengers. Some studies even find
that campaign spending has no marginal product for the incumbent. Public policy essays
have taken this to mean that money means more to challengers than it does to incumbents.
Many researchers believe this is the reason incumbents favor spending limits.
These interpretations overlook that the marginal product they are measuring is the result
not only of how much candidates spend, but also of their platforms. These platforms are
8For more on the relationship between spending limits and voter welfare, the interested reader may consult
several authors. Aranson and Hinich (1979), and Mueller and Stratmann (1994).24
determined by each candidate’s strategy. The observed marginal products are equilibrium
values that tell us as much about candidates’ strategies as they do about the inherent
productivity of their campaign spending. This means that the effect of spending limits may
go beyond increasing the vote margins of incumbents. An incumbent can win quite handily
even without limits by choosing a platform that gives him a very high productivity of funds.
But such a platform might not give his loyal supporters as much as they had wished for.
The incumbent might therefore want to choose a platform that maximizes the return to his
supporters. Such a platform would not necessarily be the one which wins him the most
votes. Instead of winning the incumbent more votes, the major function of a spending limit
could be to assure his supporters a larger share of the government ‘‘jackpot.’’
APPENDIX
Deriving a Candidate’s Marginal Product of Campaign Spending
To see how spending changes a candidate’s vote count we first have to get an expression
for his total vote count. Let us consider the incumbent. Citizen i will vote for the incumbent
if his ￿i
I,C > 0 . This means that the incumbent’s total vote count is the number of citizens for
whom this inequality holds. The shaded area in Figure 3 shows the proportion of votes the
candidate would gain. I have drawn a uniform distribution of voters purely for convenience.
Total votes is the integral of this curve between zero and the maximum delta to be found











where K is a constant representing the height of the uniform distribution. It is tempting to
simply take the derivative of this function with respect to campaign spending to get at the
marginal product of spending, but this would be a mistake. Consider the effect of campaign











This term differs for every individual because income in the uniform distribution case differs
for every individual. A fall in the incumbent’s variance brought about by a rise in campaign
spending will have a different effect on each voter’s propensity to vote for the incumbent.
Voters who expect less income from the incumbent will feel a larger increase in their
propensity to vote for him because low income means a greater sense of risk aversion. A
reduction in variance will have a very reassuring effect on them. The fact that spending
has a different effect on each voter means that a rise in spending does not simply shift
the distribution to the right. It bunches the distribution up at its lower levels. Changes in
campaign spending actually change the distribution function. Though it is beyond the scope
of this essay to derive an analytical expression for such a function, several pertinent qualitative
observations are possible. Researchers have a tendency to think that the incumbent’s marginal
product of campaign spending is low. Implicitly they may have in mind the
∂σI
∂SI term of the
above equation. It is true that spending changes this quantity but what is important for the
marginal product is the term that multiplies this quantity, namely u  (Y i
I) . If the incumbent
has a policy of redistributing heavily from the lower income groups to a preferred few,
there will be many people for whom this second term is large. This will tend to increase
the incumbent’s marginal product of spending and this effect may dominate the low bang
per buck his money gets in reducing the variance of his perceived platform. Of course a
high marginal product does not mean high votes. His marginal product is high precisely
because the incumbent may be sacrificing votes to win kickbacks from special interests. The
larger point is that the platforms candidates adopt (the distribution of incomes Y i) play an
important role in their marginal products of campaign spending. This means that candidate
strategies may be just as important to marginal products as technical considerations governing
a diminishing scope of people they can reach through advertising.
Value of Information
To calculate the dollar value of utility voters get from extra spending by the incumbent,
we first note that the utility rests on several layers of uncertainty. He is uncertain of which
candidate will make it into office, and once in office, he is uncertain of how the candidate26
will perform. This means that voter i’s overall expected utility is:
E(ui)=PI(SI,S C)E[u(Y
I
i ) ]+[ 1− PI(SI,S C)]E[u(Y
C
i )]
where PI is the probability the incumbent will win, S denotes spending by either the incumbent
I or the challenger C, E[u(Y I
i )] is the utility voter i can expect from the incumbent over his
term of office, if the incumbent wins the election. The change in overall expected the utility
the voter experiences when the incumbent increases his spending is to simplify the notation


































This says that the individual may experience either an increase in expected utility or a decrease
in expected utility when the incumbent increases spending. Suppose the individual does not
like the incumbent (￿ I,C < 0). Then if advertising raises the incumbent’s chance of winning,
the voter’s expected utility falls. However, a rise in spending also clarifies the candidate’s
position. This effect always increases the voter’s utility because it narrows the possible range
out good and bad surprises he anticipates. Being risk averse, he values a decrease in the
downside more than an increase in the upside. It is really this second term to consider when
discussing the value of information. It represents the degree to which campaign advertising
clarifies the candidate’s position. Campaign spending of the incumbent SI affects this term
by changing σI (for the remainder of this exposition I will assume that the incumbent cannot
change the variance of the perceived challenger platform, so that
∂EC
∂SI = 0). So the final
effect on utility will depend on how well advertising can change the perception of risk and
on how risk averse the voter is. We can isolate this last term in more detail. From the











Dividing both sides by u (Y I






where γi is voter i’s coefficient of relative risk aversion.
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SIMULATION OF HOW THE SEATS OF THE
INCUMBENT PARTY AND ITS OPPOSITION
CHANGE OVER THE COURSE OF THREE
ELECTIONS
Republicans Democrats
Incumbents Challengers Incumbents Challengers
Before first election 20 10 10 20
Before second election 17 13 13 17
Before third election 16 14 14 16
In this Table, Republicans control the legislature with 20 seats. Democrats have 10
seats. Each incumbent of both parties has a 70% chance of winning. Over time (afer
five elections) the parties will converge to an equal number of seats.